Application Note Implementing Run-Time Safety and Security With the C29x Safety and Security Unit



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Application Specific MCU - Automotive

ABSTRACT

The Safety and Security Unit (SSU) is an integrated module in C29x devices that enables run-time functional safety and cybersecurity protections for application code. The features of the SSU enable robust Freedom from Interference (FFI), secure task isolation, debug security and firmware update protections in hardware, maintaining low-latency performance needed for real-time control systems. The SysConfig tool, provided as part of the MCU SDK, provides an easy-to-use graphical user interface (GUI) for configuring the SSU and enabling safety and security protections in user applications. This application note examines the various features of the SSU, and how embedded system developers can use the SysConfig to design and implement run-time safety and security in real-time applications.

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1 Introduction

The Texas Instruments C29 CPU delivers industry-leading performance for real-time control applications. With a 128-bit Very Large Instruction Word (VLIW) architecture, 64-bit fixed-point and floating-point operations, ultra-low latency processing and hardware interrupt prioritization, the C29 is well-equipped to run the most demanding automotive and industrial control applications. The SSU, in concert with the C29 CPU, helps system designers meet the most rigorous modern standards for safety and security in the real-time control applications, without compromising real-time performance. With the SSU, users can achieve true FFI, secure task isolation and advanced debug and firmware update security, while maintaining the same high-speed and low-latency processing needed for the most demanding real-time control systems.

This application note describes how to implement run-time application safety and security in a real-time control system using the C29x CPU and SSU. The C29x, SSU architecture provides dynamic context-sensitive memory protection, secure task isolation with multiple dedicated CPU stack pointers, and multiuser debug ZONEs for security.

2 Supplemental Online Information

For detailed descriptions of the C29x CPU and the SSU on a specific device, see the device-specific data sheet and the corresponding Technical Reference Manual (TRM).

This application report was written using the F29H85x family of devices. The MCU SDK and SysConfig tool support all F29x platform devices.

- C29x CPU and Instruction Set User's Guide
- F29H85x and F29P58x Real-Time Microcontrollers Data Sheet
- F29H85x and F29P58x Real-Time Microcontrollers Technical Reference Manual

Additional support is provided by the TI E2E[™] Community.



3 SSU Overview

The SSU is an integral part of the C29 CPU subsystem, providing context-sensitive memory protection and run-time code isolation, debug security, and secure firmware updates. The SSU acts as a firewall between the C29 CPU and the rest of the system, enforcing user access protection policies and managing debug access and Flash controller operations. Figure 3-1 shows a simplified overview of the SSU as integrated into the C29 subsystem. The features available in the SSU can be used to achieve true FFI in a real-time control system without adding software overhead, which can otherwise negatively impact real-time performance. With the SSU, system designers can combine multiple control and communication functions on the same CPU core, while keeping each function isolated from the others. This can lead to a reduction in the number of cores required to reach system goals, or help achieve higher system safety integrity levels.




Figure 3-1. SSU System Block Diagram (Simplified View)



4 Key Concept Definitions

This section contains the definitions of key concepts.

Access Protection Range (APR)	This is the basic unit of memory protection in the SSU. An access protection range covers a specific region of Flash memory, SRAM, or peripherals. Each APR defines read and write access permissions for every LINK. An APR can also be configured as a code region, which enables CPU instruction fetches from that memory region.
LINK	In a C29 CPU subsystem, LINKs form the basis for context-sensitive memory protection. Each LINK can represent one or more regions of executable code. The associated LINK identifier is used to determine what data memory regions (APRs) can be accessed by that code.
STACK	STACKs isolate code execution contexts from each other. Each STACK has a dedicated stack pointer in the C29 CPU, and provides hardware safety and security isolation of code from other STACKs. Every LINK belongs to one and only one STACK, but a STACK can contain multiple LINKs.
ZONE	ZONEs determine debug and firmware update permissions. While APRs, LINKs, and STACKs are defined independently for each CPU, ZONEs span the entire device, excluding the Hardware Security Module (HSM) (which is not governed by the SSU).
HSM	The Hardware Security Manager is a self-contained subsystem within the device that provides key security services, including secure boot, secure storage, debug and firmware update security, and run-time cryptographic services. The HSM is different from the SSU, which is an integral part of the application C29 CPU subsystem. The HSM and SSU perform complementary and orthogonal roles on the device, except for debug authorization: both the HSM and SSU must authorize access to a resource before debug access is enabled to that resource.
Partial Debug	When a ZONE is enabled for partial debug, the user is allowed to debug CPU execution (halt, resume, and view CPU registers) but debug read and write accesses to memories that can otherwise be accessed by LINKs in that ZONE are blocked.
Full Debug	When a ZONE is enabled for full debug, the user can debug the CPU and perform all memory accesses permitted for any LINK within that ZONE.
SECCFG	This is a special Flash region that is designated for storing SSU configuration settings. The values stored in the SECCFG region are loaded into the SSU registers during device boot. Most of these settings cannot be changed during run time, and can only be modified by programming new values into SECCFG and resetting the device.
UPP	User Protection Policy. This is the collection of SSU configuration settings that are programmed into the SECCFG region.
Memory Region	A region of memory configured in SysConfig. This is equivalent to an Access Protection Range (APR).
Module	In SysConfig, a Module consists of a LINK, the code memory regions (executable APRs) that are associated with that LINK, the data memory regions (data APRs) and peripherals that <i>belong</i> to the module, and peripheral interrupts associated with the module. In practice, modules allow the user to organize the application into distinct tasks or partitions that can be isolated from one another for functional safety and security.
Shared Memory	In SysConfig, a Shared Memory consists of one or more APRs that are accessible by multiple Modules. Shared Memories can be used to share data between Modules in a distinct memory range, while maintaining safety protection for other memory regions belonging to those modules.
Sandbox RTOS	In SysConfig, a Sandbox consists of a STACK, and can contain one or more Modules. A Real-Time Operating System, such as FreeRTOS [®] or AUTOSAR [®] .
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5 Safety and Security Goals

The Safety and Security Unit enables system designers to accomplish important safety- and security-related objectives in the design of real-time embedded systems. These objectives include:

- 1. **Memory Protection:** An essential element of an embedded microcontroller that supports functional safety goals is a Memory Protection Unit, or MPU. An MPU enforces access control rules over memories in the system, to prevent unauthorized reads, accidental overwrites, or unauthorized modifications to code and data. Memory protection plays an important role in maintaining system stability, reliability, and security. The SSU provides advanced MPU functionality that is context-sensitive, switching protections in real time without software intervention.
- 2. Freedom from Interference: In the ISO 26262 standard, which defines functional safety standards for automotive electronics, Freedom from Interference (FFI) is defined as the "absence of cascading failures between two or more elements that can lead to the violation of a safety requirement." A cascading failure occurs when one component in the system fails, and the failure of that component causes a different component in the system to fail; these failures can result in a progressively growing positive feedback loop. The SSU provides mechanisms to fully isolate multiple different system software components from each other, such that a safety failure in one component does not compromise the rest of the application.
- 3. **Security Isolation:** In addition to safety freedom from interference, the SSU supports security isolation goals, giving each application component a secure execution environment that protects the confidentiality and integrity of code and data assets during run time.
- 4. Real-Time Performance: A critical goal of the SSU is to provide safety and security protections without impact to real-time performance. Memory protection, security isolation, and other SSU functions are all performed in real time without software intervention, eliminating extra latency due to supervisor software overhead. Combined with the industry-leading performance of the C29 CPU, this enables system designers to combine multiple control functions on the same CPU without sacrificing performance, safety or security goals, leading to reduced overall system cost.
- 5. Secure Debug and Firmware Updates: The SSU provides the ability to partition the system software into multiple user debug ZONEs, enabling multiple teams to securely maintain and debug different software components on the same chip. The SSU also manages Flash firmware, controlling which users and code are permitted to perform firmware updates, and enabling mechanisms such as Firmware-Over-The-Air (FOTA) and Live Firmware Update (LFU) with A, B swapping and rollback protection in hardware.



6 System Design

The first step in configuring the SSU for an application is to determine the required system partitioning. The SSU provides three levels of hierarchy for partitioning the application subsystem:

- 1. ZONEs : Each ZONE determines debug access for all C29 CPUs on the chip. ZONEs are designed to enable multiple code owners or entities to develop and maintain different partitions of an application residing on the same chip. For instance, if a certain aspect of the embedded application is owned and maintained by a third-party vendor, then the system can be divided into two ZONEs:
 - a. ZONE1: Primary user ZONE, owned by the primary system developer;
 - b. ZONE2: Secondary user ZONE, owned by the third-party developer.

This partitioning enables the third-party developer to develop, debug and maintain an application function on the same chip without requiring access to the primary user's code and data assets. Furthermore, each user ZONE provides two levels of debug authorization:

- a. Partial debug CPU debug commands such as halt, step, and breakpoints allowed, but no memory access
- b. Full debug Access to memory locations is provided as permitted for all LINKs contained within the ZONE.

As an example, a secondary user such as a third-party developer can debug an application module in ZONE2, and also be given partial debug access to ZONE1, so that the secondary user can effectively debug the application in context without having access to the primary user's assets.

Each device has 3 user ZONEs available: ZONE1, ZONE2, and ZONE3. ZONE1 is the primary user ZONE; ZONE2 and ZONE3 are secondary user ZONEs.

- 2. Sandboxes (STACKs): Sandboxes provide security and safety isolation within a CPU. Each Sandbox is associated with a STACK in the SSU. Each sandbox has a dedicated physical stack pointer in the CPU that is inaccessible by other sandboxes, and a dedicated stack memory AP region with read/write permissions restricted to only code belonging to that sandbox. Special C29 CPU gate instructions are required when crossing from one STACK to another. These instructions must be inserted by the compiler at the entry and exit of each function, and at function calls or branches. These mechanisms provide security protection against malware attacks that attempt to redirect code execution or manipulate the stack.
 - A Sandbox consists of an SSU STACK and everything associated with the STACK, including the stack memory AP region. Each STACK belongs to one ZONE, but a ZONE can contain multiple STACKs. For each CPU, there are three predefined STACKs:
 - STACK0: This STACK is reserved for TI internal use and cannot be configured by the user.
 - STACK1: This STACK is primarily used for bootloaders, but can optionally be associated with other user application code. STACK1 is always associated with ZONE1, and contains only one LINK (LINK1).
 - STACK2: This is the primary user STACK. STACK2 is always associated with ZONE1. STACK2 always contains LINK2, but can also contain other LINKs.
- 3. **Application Modules (LINKs)**: An application module is a basic partition of a system application. Each module consists of a single SSU LINK, one or more code memory AP regions containing the code of the LINKs, all data memory AP regions associated with the LINK, and all peripherals and interrupts associated with the Module. Typically, the code AP regions contain .text and other linker output sections containing code, and the data AP regions contain .bss, .const, and other linker output sections containing data and variables.
 - Each LINK enables SSU memory protections, providing safety protection from other LINKs in the CPU. Every AP region defines access permissions for each LINK. These permissions are enforced in real time for every instruction that performs a memory access, depending on the LINK ID instruction. Functions that require safety isolation from each other can be placed in separate Modules. If security isolation is required, then these Modules are placed in separate sandboxes; if not, the Modules can be placed in the same sandbox.
 - For each CPU, there are three predefined LINKs
 - a. LINK0: This LINK is reserved for TI internal use and cannot be configured by the user.

- b. LINK1: This LINK is primarily used for bootloaders, but can optionally be associated with other user application code. CPU1.LINK1 has some special fixed permissions that enable access to certain system configuration registers, in addition to AP-defined protections.
- c. LINK2: This is the primary user LINK. CPU1.LINK2 is the system security root LINK (SROOT), and has special fixed permissions that enable access to system configuration registers and override controls. This LINK typically executes privileged host functions at the RTOS level.




Figure 6-1. Example of Software Partitioning With SSU

Figure 6-1 shows an example of SSU system partitioning on a single-CPU, single-ZONE system. In this system, the RTOS runs in STACK2.LINK2, and is responsible for initializing system configuration, setting up peripherals and interrupts, and starting the main execution loop. There are two control functions, *Control Loop1* and *Control Loop 2*. Each of these control functions is placed in a separate Application Module (LINK), and both Application Modules are placed in the same Sandbox. In this system, safety isolation is required between the two control functions, but security isolation is not required between the two. A fourth Module hosts communications code, such as UART or CAN-FD code. Because data coming from an external interface can potentially pose a security threat to other functions in the system, this Module is placed in a separate Sandbox. Finally, a fifth Module contains common code functions which are shared between all the other Modules in the system. The LINK associated with this module is defined as the Access Protection Inheritance LINK (APILINK) for other LINKs. The Common Code Module is also placed in a separate sandbox to maintain security isolation from the rest of the system (while maintaining inherited permissions).

SysConfig includes full support for multicore applications. The built-in memory allocator tool automatically manages memory regions associated with application modules across multiple CPUs, and also manages the allocation of peripherals across the entire device. The SysConfig tool also includes a Shared Memory feature that enables the definition of memory regions that can be shared between modules on the same CPU or multiple CPUs.

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7 Configuring the SSU

7.1 Flash SECCFG Region

The Flash SECCFG region is used for storing the User Protection Policy (UPP). This is a special NONMAIN region of the C29 application Flash banks that is dedicated to SSU configuration and boot settings. The settings programmed into SECCFG are loaded at device start-up into SSU memory-mapped registers, and, in most cases, locked until the next device reset. For each primary CPU in the device (that is, odd-numbered C29 CPU, for example: CPU1, CPU3), there are two SECCFG sectors: the base sector, and the reserve sector. These are designed such that one sector can be erased and programmed with new configuration values while the other is active.

Note

Do not try to erase and reprogram a currently active SECCFG sector. If a device reset occurs during the process of erasing and programming, the device subsequently fails to boot and becomes inoperable. Always program new configurations into the alternate SECCFG sector address. The Flash address translation logic automatically routes this address to the current inactive SECCFG sector during program and erase operations. The SysConfig tool automatically allocates the SECCFG image to the alternate sector in the generated .out file to enable the correct update procedure.

To protect the integrity of the SSU user protection policy, the SECCFG sector includes a CRC value that is checked at boot time. This CRC covers access protection settings, LINK and STACK configuration, Flash write and Flash erase protections, Flash update permissions, debug settings, boot settings, and the SSU operating mode. Debug passwords are excluded from this CRC computation.

A comprehensive map of the SECCFG sector is available in the device technical reference manual.

7.2 SSU Development Life Cycle

The SSU can be configured to operate in one of three modes: SSUMODE1, SSUMODE2, and SSUMODE3. These operating modes are intended to facilitate the development process as the user implements safety and security features into a system design. The SSU can be reconfigured to change from any operating mode to any other operating mode, as long as the user has the necessary permissions to update the SECCFG sector.

Units shipped from Texas Instruments start out in SSUMODE1. In this mode, the entire memory map range is mapped to LINK2 (the security root LINK), and all LINKs have full read and write access to all AP-configurable memory regions. Hard-coded protections remain active even in SSUMODE1; however, since all code runs as LINK2, there are effectively no restrictions on user code.

In SSUMODE2, AP region protections are enforced, but debug and Flash update protections remain disabled. For best results, fully validate application functionality in SSUMODE1 first, then implement SSU settings and test them in SSUMODE2. Once validation of run-time safety and security settings is completed, debug passwords can be configured, and the device can be placed in SSUMODE3. In this mode, debug ports are closed by default, authentication is enforced, and Flash update protections are active.

Note

Flash write and Flash erase protections are permanent and cannot be reversed, irrespective of the SSUMODE setting. This feature is intended for use cases where the user needs to make a certain portion of Flash code immutable, for example, for the purpose of implementing a security algorithm. Do not attempt to configure Flash write and Flash erase protections before finalizing device Flash contents.

7.3 Using the SysConfig Tool

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SysConfig is a graphical user interface (GUI) tool that provides an easy-to-use method for configuring TI microcontroller products, including F29x Real-Time Control MCUs. SysConfig automatically generates initialization code for the device, including peripherals, interrupts, pin multiplexing initialization, and more. SysConfig also automatically identifies device setup errors and provides helpful guidance to rectify configuration issues, provides graphical visualizations, and enables easy porting of applications between different devices.



C29 SysConfig is available as part of the device MCU SDK, and requires the SysConfig tool, which is delivered built-in with the Code Composer Studio[™] (CCS) integrated development environment (IDE), and is also available as a standalone tool for use with other development environments.

C29 SysConfig is a comprehensive tool for defining and implementing SSU protection and isolation within an F29x application. The tool provides an easy-to-use flow for defining application partitions, allocating code and data sections, defining protections for memory and peripherals, and implementing debug security options. C29 SysConfig automatically generates all the required code and output files required to implement these protections, including the SECCFG sector image, application linker command file, header files, and any required initialization code.

7.3.1 Enabling System Security Configuration

The first step to enabling SSU functionality in an application is to add the *System Security* option in SysConfig, by clicking the (+) button to the right of the module name in the left bar, see Figure 7-1.

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SENT	Ð	UPP Revision	0		board.c	C29 SysConfig	-	
SPI	Ð	SECCFG Update Counter	FFFFFFFFFFFF		board.h	C29 SysConfig		
UART RTDMA (4)	Ð	Bank Mode	MODE0 : All CPU1, no FOTA	•	board.cmd.genlibs	C29 SysConfig		
RTDMA1	÷				_	, ,		
RTDMA1 MPU	÷	Boot Settings		~		C29 SysConfig	-	
RTDMA2 RTDMA2 MPU	⊕ ⊕	Flack the data Orange		~	interrupt_list.txt	C29 SysConfig	-	
(BAR (7)	U	Flash Update Owner			errorevent_list.txt	C29 SysConfig	-	
CLB XBAR EPWM XBAR	(†) (†)	Flash Write/Erase Protections		~	pinmux.csv	C29 SysConfig	-	
ICL XBAR	Ð				device.c	C29 SysConfig		
INPUTXBAR INPUT	\oplus	Register Lock & Commit		~		, ,		
MINDB XBAR OUTPUT XBAR	Ð				device.h	C29 SysConfig	-	
XBAR FLAGS	(†) (†)	SSU Settings		^	ti_drivers_config.c	C29 SysConfig	-	
OARD COMPONENTS (1)		Flash size used as Load memory (in kl	B) <u>4</u>		ti_drivers_config.h	C29 SysConfig	-	
FSI REERTOS CONFIGURATI.	(+)	SPECIAL MODULES MODULES	SHARED MEMORY SANDBOXES		clocktree.h	ClockTree Tool	-	
FREERTOS	Ð				ssu_summary.csv	C29 Security	-	
SYSTEM SECURITY CONF System Security 1/1		Enable LINK2 (Most secure Link) Enable Common Code Module	\checkmark		linker.cmd	C29 Security	-	
MEMORY CONFIGURATIO		Enable Link1 (Bootloader Link)	 ✓ ✓ 			,		
Memory Region 12		Enable STACK1 (Bootloader STACK)	_		ssu_config.c	C29 Security	-	
Sections SSU (2)	\oplus				ssu_config.h	C29 Security	-	
Link 3/15	•	LINK2		~	seccfg.c	C29 Security	-	
Stack 2/7				~	ti_dpl_config.c	TI Driver Porting Layer (DPL)	-	

Figure 7-1. System Security Configuration Page

In the *System Security* page, there are several configuration option groups. The first of these is the *Security Mode*, which contains settings for SSU operation mode, UPP revision number, and Flash bank mode. For more information on Flash bank modes, see the device technical reference manual.

Note

Selecting a Flash bank mode here does not cause the bank mode to be programmed into the device. This selection only informs the SysConfig tool about the intended bank mode configuration for the device, so that memory allocation can be performed correctly. To program the device to a new bank mode, use the CCS Flash plug-in, or a Flash programmer tool such as UniFlash.

The *System Security* page also includes configuration options for selecting the device boot mode, configuring Flash update protections, debug passwords, and locking SSU registers. Some of these settings, such as debug passwords and Flash update owner settings, require SSUMODE3 operation to take effect.



7.3.2 Configuring Application Modules

SysConfig provides an easy way to create AP ranges and configure LINK permissions based on object files, libraries, and input sections. When a new Application Module is created, SysConfig automatically creates a LINK, together with a standard set of AP regions:

- A code region that executes out of Flash (ModuleName_codeAPR_Flash)
- [Optional] A code region that executes out of RAM (ModuleName_codeAPR_RAM)
- A variable data region in RAM (ModuleName_dataAPR_RW)
- A read-only data region that can optionally be placed in RAM (ModuleName_dataAPR_RO)

In addition to the standard regions, the user can configure custom section names to be associated with the Application Module, by selecting the *Use Custom Sections* checkbox, and specifying custom sections to be added. SysConfig adds all the defined AP regions to the SSU settings, and configures the associated LINK to have the appropriate permissions for each region. In addition, an output section is created in the linker command file for each AP region, instructing the linker to place input sections in that memory region as configured.

To associate code functions and data with the Application Module, simply add file names to the *Files to be included* input field, minus the file extension. Libraries can also be added to the Module by editing the corresponding input field (with the library file extension included). To select specific objects from a library, use linker command file syntax, for example myLibrary.lib<myFuncs1.o>. That is all that needs to be done: SysConfig automatically assigns the .text, .bss, .data, .rodata, and .const input sections for each object to the corresponding output sections in the linker command file.

To allocate memory to the module, simply specify the amount of memory required for each APR type (Flash code, RAM code, RW data, RO data). SysConfig automatically arranges AP regions in memory, selecting the best memory type as required for minimum wait states. In cases where an Application Module must execute from RAM instead of Flash to meet performance requirements, select the *Place .text section in RAM* checkbox. When this checkbox is selected, SysConfig creates a new RAM code region, and configures the linker command file to load the associated code from Flash at boot and run from RAM. Read-only or constant data such as look-up tables can also be placed in RAM for zero-wait-state access, if desired.

In addition to code and data memory regions, existing peripherals that have been configured through SysConfig can also be auto-allocated to each Application Module. Two drop-down select fields are provided for enabling either read-write access or read-only access to the specified peripherals. Additionally, peripheral interrupts can easily be added using the Interrupts Included field. This option configures the PIPE module to assign the correct execution LINK to the selected peripheral interrupts.

The *Module Memory Regions* drop-down frame can be expanded to show the details of each AP region that has been created for the current Application Module. This frame also provides a few additional configuration options:

- Use 0 WS Memory only: Restricts RAM code to zero-wait-state RAM.
- Create equivalent RTDMA MPU region: Creates an MPU region with the same start and end address for DMA transfers.
- Share with other cores: Enables a memory region to be used by multiple CPUs.



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EQEP EQEP	\oplus	2 added	🕀 ADD 📋 REI	IOVE ALL	84	libc.a <pre init.c.obj="">(.rodata .const)</pre>	
SYNC	\oplus			-	85	libc.a <exit.c.obj>(.rodata .const)</exit.c.obj>	
✓ COMMUNICATION (9)		ControlLoop1		Ō	86	libc.a <startup.c.obj>(.rodata .const)</startup.c.obj>	
FSIRX	\oplus	ControlLoop2		Ō	87	rtos.o.o(.rodata .const)	
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MCAN	Ð	Code and Data Sections		^	91 92	.ControlLoop1_codeAPR_Flash : SECURE_GROUP(STACK2_STACK)	{
					92	<pre>cloop1.o(.text) driverlib.lib</pre>	
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UART	\oplus	Use Custom Sections			97	cloop1.o(.bss .data)	
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RTDMA1	\oplus	Section Placement		^	99	<pre>> CONTROLLOOP1_DATAAPR_RW</pre>	
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RTDMA2	$\overline{+}$	Place the .text section in RAM			101	.ControlLoop1_dataAPR_RO : {	
RTDMA2 MPU	÷	Place RO section in RAM			102	cloop1.o(.rodata .const)	
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CLB XBAR	÷	Define Code and Data sizes		~	104	<pre>} > CONTROLLOOP1_DATAAPR_RO, palign(8)</pre>	
EPWM XBAR	Ð	Define Code and Data sizes			105 106	.ControlLoop2 codeAPR Flash : SECURE GROUP(STACK2 STACK)	
ICL XBAR	÷	Code size in Flash (in kB)	48		105	cloop2_timers.o(.text)	د
					108	<pre>> CONTROLLOOP2 CODEAPR FLASH, palign(8)</pre>	
INPUTXBAR INPUT	÷	Code size in RAM (in kB)	0		109	j v connorron z_corrant_reasi, parzgn(o)	
MINDB XBAR	÷	RW Data size in RAM (in kB)	16		110	.ControlLoop2 codeAPR RAM : SECURE GROUP(STACK2 STACK) {	
OUTPUT XBAR	\oplus	RO Data size in Flash / RAM (in kB)	16		111	cloop2_timers.o(.TI.ramfunc)	
XBAR FLAGS	\oplus				112	> CONTROLLOOP2_CODEAPR_RAM	
 BOARD COMPONENTS (1))				113		
FSI	\oplus	Peripheral Access		^	114	.ControlLoop2_dataAPR_RW : {	
 FREERTOS CONFIGURATI. 			ADCA_RESULT_REGS, EPWM1_REG		115	cloop2_timers.o(.bss .data)	
FREERTOS	÷	Peripherals with RW access	ADCA_RESULI_REGS, EPWINIT_REG	.	116	<pre>} > CONTROLLOOP2_DATAAPR_RW</pre>	
✓ SYSTEM SECURITY CONF	-				117		
System Security 1/1	A (+)	Peripherals with RO access	None	-	118 119	.ControlLoop2_dataAPR_RO : {	
MEMORY CONFIGURATIO.					119	<pre>cloop2_timers.o(.rodata .const) > CONTROLLOOP2 DATAAPR RO, palign(8)</pre>	
Memory Region 19		Interrupts Included in this module	myADC01_INT	v	120	<pre>} > CONTROLLOOP2_DATAAPR_RO, pailgn(8)</pre>	
Sections					121	.CommonCodeModule_codeAPR_Flash : SECURE_GROUP(STACK2_STAG	CK COMMONCODE) {
	Ð	Module Memory Regions		^	123	error.o(.text)	
✓ SSU (2)					124	libc.a<*>(.text)	
Link 5/15		codeAPR_Flash		~	125	libclang_rt.builtins.a<*>(.text)	
Stack 2/7	⊘⊕	coueAPK_Flash			126	<pre>> COMMONCODEMODULE_CODEAPR_FLASH, palign(8)</pre>	
TI DRIVER PORTING LAYE					107		

Figure 7-2. Application Module Configuration Example

7.3.3 Configuring Special Modules

SysConfig provides options to directly configure Modules that have predefined functions in the system:

- LINK2 the system Security Root LINK
- LINK1 the bootloader LINK
- The Common Code Module, for access protection inheritance

Type Filter Text X	\leftrightarrow \rightarrow Software $ ightarrow$ System Security				(i) <> (i)	€ :
C ECAP	Boot Settings	~	(i) Problems			к _ы ×
EQEP SYNC	Flash Update Owner	~		SUPPRESSED () ()INFOS ()		
COMMUNICATION (9) FSIRX	Flash Write/Erase Protections	~	·	etails		
FSITX	Register Locks	~	 < > Generated Files Filter: all 			κ ^π ×
MCAN PMBUS	SSU Settings	^	File name	Category C29 SysConfig	Include in buil	d D
SENT (+) SPI (+)	Flash size used as Load memory (in kB) 4		board.h	C29 SysConfig	-	8
UART (+) ~ RTDMA (4) RTDMA1 (+)	Enable LINK2 (Most secure Link)	^	board.cmd.genlibs	C29 SysConfig	-	•
RTDMA1 MPU RTDMA2	Enable Common Code Module		peripheral_frame_mapping.h	C29 SysConfig C29 SysConfig	•	8
RTDMA2 MPU ⊕ ✓ XBAR (7)	Enable STACK1 (Bootloader STACK) in applicat		errorevent_list.txt	C29 SysConfig	-	8
CLB XBAR EPWM XBAR ICL XBAR	LINK2	~	b pinmux.csv b device.c	C29 SysConfig C29 SysConfig	•	8
INPUTXBAR INPUT MINDB XBAR	CommonCodeModule	~	device.h	C29 SysConfig	•	8
OUTPUT XBAR ⊕ XBAR FLAGS ⊕	LINK1	~	ssu_summary.csv	C29x Security C29x Security	-	8
BOARD COMPONENTS (1) FSI FREERTOS CONFIGURATION (1)	STACK1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		C29x Security		8
FREERTOS CONFIGURATION (1) FREERTOS SYSTEM SECURITY CONFIGURATI	Modules	~	ssu_config.h	C29x Security	•	
System Security 1/1 🔮 🕀	Shared Memory	~	<u>seccfg.c</u> <u>clocktree.h</u>	C29x Security ClockTree Tool	•	8
Linker Section Memory Region 33 SSU (2)	Sandboxes	~	ssu_ex1_mode2_syscfg	Configuration Script		•
LINK (Access Protect 6/15 C +	Additional Memory Regions	^	16 Total Files			

Figure 7-3. Special Modules Configuration Example



After enabling special modules, each module can then be configured by expanding the drop-down box. The following sections explain the special Modules in more detail.

7.3.3.1 LINK2 Configuration

LINK2 is the most secure LINK on each CPU. LINK2 has elevated privileges, including the ability to access secure CPU registers and perform supervisory tasks. In most cases, RTOS layer functions are placed in LINK2. CPU1.LINK2 in particular has special device-wide elevated privileges, including:

- · Ability to write to device configuration registers
- · Ability to write to certain SSU registers
- Ability to configure the RTDMA, including MPU configuration

Place all code and data sections that are responsible for performing initial system configuration and board configuration and running operating system functions in LINK2. Some default sections are automatically configured by SysConfig, including C initialization functions from the libc.a library.

📰 😇 Type Filter Text 🗙	\leftarrow \rightarrow Software $ ightarrow$ System Security			
en Ecap	SSU Settings		A linker.cmd	COMMUNCODEMODULE CODEAPK FLASH : OFIGIN = 0X1001A000, length = 0X00001000-
EPWM 1/18	SSO Settings		24	COMMONCODEMODULE DATAAPR R0 : origin = 0x10018000, length = 0x00001000
EQEP +	Flash size used as Load memory (in kB)	4	26	, ,
SYNC			27 }	
✓ COMMUNICATION (9)	SPECIAL MODULES MODULES SHARED	MEMORY SANDBOXES	28	
FSIRX +				ECTIONS
FSITX	Enable LINK2 (Most secure Link)		30 { 31	codestart : > 0x10001000, palign(8)
12C (+)	Enable Common Code Module		32	constart : > 0x10001000, paign(8) cert : {} > CERT, palign(8)
LIN	Enable Link1 (Bootloader Link)		33	.cinit :> APR_FLASHLOAD_CPU1, palign(8) // Tables for explicitly init:
MCAN	, , ,	-	34	.binit : > APR_FLASHLOAD_CPU1, palign(8) // Boot time copy tables
PMBUS +	Enable STACK1 (Bootloader STACK) in applic		35	.ovly : > APR_FLASHLOAD_CPU1, palign(8) // Copy tables other than boo
SENT	LINK2	^	36	
SPI			37 38	.stack_STACK1_STACK : { .+= 256; } > STACK1_STACKMEM_APR,
UART (+)	Name	LINK2	- 39	TYPE(NOINIT), START(STACK1 STACK start),
 RTDMA (4) 			40	END(STACK1_STACK_start),
RTDMA1	Code and Data Sections	^	41	.stack : > STACK2_STACKMEM_APR
RTDMA1 MPU 🕀	File to be included (comma separated)	rtos.o	42	
RTDMA2	· · · · · ·		43	
RTDMA2 MPU (+)	Libraries to be included (comma separate	myrtos.lib	44	.LINK2_codeAPR_Flash : SECURE_GROUP(STACK2_STACK) {
V XBAR (7)	Use Custom Sections		45	<pre>libc.a<boot.c.obj>(.text) libc.a<autoinit.c.obj>(.text)</autoinit.c.obj></boot.c.obj></pre>
CLB XBAR ()	Default code sections included in Link2 (c	>(.text), libc.a <autoinit.c.obj>(.text), *(.text.lir</autoinit.c.obj>	40	*(.text.link2)
EPWM XBAR	Default sections included in Link? (comm	libc.a <copy_zero_init.c.obj>,libc.a<pre_init.c.< td=""><td></td><td>libc.a<copy init.c.obj="" zero="">(.text)</copy></td></pre_init.c.<></copy_zero_init.c.obj>		libc.a <copy init.c.obj="" zero="">(.text)</copy>
ICL XBAR (+)	Denault sections included in Link2 (commi-	inderakcopy_zero_inite.objk,inderakpre_inite.	49	libc.a <pre_init.c.obj>(.text)</pre_init.c.obj>
INPUTXBAR INPUT		^	50	libc.a <exit.c.obj>(.text)</exit.c.obj>
	Section Placement	^	51	libc.a <startup.c.obj>(.text)</startup.c.obj>
MINDB XBAR OUTPUT XBAR	Place the .text section in RAM		52 53	<pre>rtos.o.o(.text) myrtos.lib<*>(.text)</pre>
			55	<pre>> LINK2 CODEAPR FLASH, palign(8)</pre>
U	Place RO section in RAM		55	/ / LINKZ_CODEARK_FERSH, Palign(8)
V BOARD COMPONENTS (1)			56	.LINK2 codeAPR RAM : SECURE GROUP(STACK2 STACK) {
FSI 🕀	Define Code and Data sizes	^	57	*(.TI.ramfunc.link2)
V FREERTOS CONFIGURATI			58	libc.a <copy_zero_init.c.obj>(.TI.ramfunc)</copy_zero_init.c.obj>
FREERTOS 🕀	Code size in Flash (in kB)	64	59	libc.a <pre_init.c.obj>(.TI.ramfunc)</pre_init.c.obj>
✓ SYSTEM SECURITY CONFI	Code size in RAM (in kB)	32	60 61	libc.a <exit.c.obj>(.TI.ramfunc) libc.a<startup.c.obj>(.TI.ramfunc)</startup.c.obj></exit.c.obj>
System Security 1/1 🤡 🕀	RW Data size in RAM (in kB)	48	62	rtos.o.o(.TI.ramfunc)
V MEMORY CONFIGURATIO	RO Data size in Flash / RAM (in kB)	32	63	myrtos.lib<*>(.TI.ramfunc)
Memory Region 12 🤡 🕀	No buta oize in riadiny form (in kb)	02	64	<pre>} > LINK2_CODEAPR_RAM</pre>
Sections 🕀	D 11 11	^	65	
✓ SSU (2)	Peripheral Access	^	66	.LINK2_dataAPR_RW : {
Link 3/15 🔮 🕀		CPU_SYS_REGS, PER_CFG_REGS_\	67	<pre>libc.a<copy_zero_init.c.obj>(.bss .data)</copy_zero_init.c.obj></pre>
Stack 2/7 🥑 🕀	Peripherals with RW access	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	68 69	libc.a <pre_init.c.obj>(.bss .data) libc.a<exit.c.obj>(.bss .data)</exit.c.obj></pre_init.c.obj>
✓ TI DRIVER PORTING LAYE			70	libc.a <exit.c.obj>(.oss .data) libc.a<startup.c.obj>(.bss .data)</startup.c.obj></exit.c.obj>
Clock 🕀	Peripherals with RO access	None 👻		

Figure 7-4. LINK2 Configuration Example

7.3.3.2 LINK1 Configuration

CPU1.LINK1 is primarily used for bootloaders, and has extra hard-coded privileges to support bootloader functions, such as the ability to write to certain system configuration registers. LINK1 can also be used as a conventional user LINK; however, adding non-bootloader-related code and data to LINK1 is not recommended except as a last resort when all other LINKs are already in use.

When any peripheral boot mode is configured in the *Boot Settings* group, SysConfig automatically configures LINK1 to have access to the respective peripherals required for that boot mode to function, for example, CAN, UART, or SPI. These peripherals are automatically added to the LINK1 module by SysConfig, in addition to certain peripherals that are always required for device boot, such as IPC and the HSM mailbox.

7.3.3.3 Adding Shared Memory

Shared memory regions are special access protection regions (APRs) that are accessible by multiple application modules. In SysConfig, shared memories can be added by selecting the *Shared Memory* tab on the *System*



Security page, and clicking the *Add* button. Multiple shared memories can be added, limited by the total number of APRs available on the CPU (including APRs that have been defined for the various Application Modules). For each shared memory, source files can be included; SysConfig adds the .bss, .data, .const, and .rodata sections from these files as configured. Custom section names can also be defined to be included.

For each shared memory, you can select which application modules require read-only permission, and which modules require write permission. SysConfig automatically configures the APR permissions as defined for the LINK for each module.

CC C	🗄 \Xi Type Filter Text 🗙	← → Software → System Security		
Common Constructions Common Constructions <td< th=""><th>-r^{eg} ECAP</th><th>Register Lock & Commit</th><th></th><th>: 🖬 ×</th></td<>	-r ^{eg} ECAP	Register Lock & Commit		: 🖬 ×
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FREERTOS APR_RESERVED_sign_CPU1	FSI			
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APR FlashLoad				
	MEMORY CONFIGURATIO	APR_FlashLoad	×	

Figure 7-5. Shared Memory Configuration Example

7.3.4 Defining Sandboxes

Use Sandboxes in SysConfig to define groups of Application Modules that must have security isolation from other parts of the application. Each Sandbox is associated with an SSU STACK, and contains at least one Application Module, as well as a stack memory AP range. All LINKs associated with the Application Modules in the Sandbox have read-write access to the Sandbox stack memory; all other LINKs have no access. Each Sandbox is associated with one debug ZONE.

SysConfig defines a SECURE_GROUP in the linker command file for each Sandbox. This setting causes the linker to require protected calls for all function calls from other STACKs into the Sandbox STACK. By default, any unprotected call into a SECURE_GROUP causes the linker to generate an error. SysConfig provides an option to auto-generate trampolines and landing calls to satisfy the protected call requirement. When enabling this option, be sure to review the output linker map file to confirm that no undesired cross-STACK trampolines to untrusted code are generated.

Note

Cross-stack trampolines can add latency due to the requirement to save and restore CPU registers to or from stack memory, potentially impacting application performance. For best performance, implement protected function calls directly in application code by adding __attribute__((c29_protected_call)) to the function definition.

Note

STACK1 configuration can be accessed under the Special Modules tab.



8 Summary

The C29x SSU enables advanced safety and security features for real-time control applications, including a novel context-sensitive memory and peripheral-protection feature that eliminates software overhead while switching between tasks or servicing interrupts, and advanced debug security options. With the easy-to-use SysConfig tool, system designers can divide an application into multiple partitions for safety and security isolation, and automatically allocate object files, libraries, and peripherals to each of these partitions. Shared memory resources can also be defined to be used by multiple application modules. SysConfig automatically handles the allocation of memories across the device to various application partitions, with full support for multicore configurations. The tool generates all required output files for implementing the desired protection policy, which can then be built into an application .out image.

9 References

- 1. Texas Instruments, C2000[™] SysConfig Application Note
- 2. Texas Instruments, TI Resource Explorer: C2000[™] real-time microcontrollers
- 3. Texas Instruments, Code Composer Studio (CCS) IDE
 - Integrated development environment (IDE) that supports TI's Microcontroller and Embedded Processor products
 - SysConfig tool is delivered integrated in CCS (built-in SysConfig support)
- 4. Texas Instruments, SysConfig Standalone Version
 - SysConfig standalone version can be used alongside other IDEs that do not have a built-in SysConfig tool

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